The EU enlargement and economic growth in the CEE new member countries by Ryszard Rapacki & Mariusz Pr�chniak
E U R O P E A N   C O MMI S S I O N
T h e   E U   E n l a r g e me n t   a n d   E c o n o mi c   G r o w t h
  I n   t h e   C E E   N e w   Me mb e r   C o u n t r i e s
 
R y s z a r d   R a p a c k i     a n d   Ma r i u s z   P r ó c h n i a k
  E c o n o mi c   P a p e r s     3 6 7 |   Ma r c h   2 0 0 9
E U R OP E A N  
E CON OMY 
Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. The Papers are intended to increase awareness 
of the technical work being done by staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analysis. 
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European 
Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: 
 
European Commission 





























This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from the website 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications  
 
A great deal of additional information is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the 











© European Communities, 2009 The EU Enlargement and Economic Growth 
In the CEE New Member Countries 
 
 
Ryszard Rapacki  and Mariusz Próchniak  
 





 Paper prepared for the Workshop: 
“Five years of an enlarged EU – a positive-sum game” 







In this paper, we aim to check whether the EU enlargement contributed to economic growth 
of ten new member countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE-10), including their real 
convergence towards the EU-15 development level. To this end, we econometrically test the 
relationships between selected macroeconomic variables linked to the EU enlargement and 
the rate of economic growth of the CEE-10 countries over the period 1996-2007. The 
variables comprise: (i) the progress of market or structural reforms, (ii) economic freedom, 
(iii) foreign aid, and (iv) the FDI inflow. 
In the first part of the study, we test the convergence hypothesis (both beta and sigma) for the 
CEE-10 group towards the EU-15 countries. In the subsequent parts, we build an econometric 
model and carry out the correlation and regression analyses, with a view to find out the 
possible effect of the EU membership on economic growth of the CEE countries. The last part 
of the paper develops possible scenarios of the real convergence of the CEE countries towards 
the EU-15. 
Our results indicate that the EU enlargement significantly contributed to economic growth of 
the CEE-10 countries and their catching up with the EU-15 development level. This 
conclusion has been supported by both the convergence analysis and the econometric test of 
economic growth determinants. According to our projections, the actual process of real 
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  1The EU Enlargement and Economic Growth 





While the traditional trade theory (Viner, 1950) implied that economic integration 
would lead to a real convergence in development levels between countries involved, some 
more recent theories (Krugman, 1991) recognized that integration might also result in rising 
development asymmetries. A similar conclusion can be derived from new models of 
economic growth (Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988), which do not confirm the convergence 
hypothesis. Recent empirical studies suggest that the trend towards income-level convergence 
tends to occur within homogeneous groups of countries, whereas heterogeneous groups are 
more likely to experience real divergence tendencies. 
Thus, the debate on economic convergence and the effects of integration is in no way 
closed. This leaves much room for discussion about the factors conducive to economic 
convergence or divergence, and calls for empirical research covering different groups of 
countries.  
In this paper, we aim to check whether the EU enlargement contributed to economic 
growth of ten new member countries from Central and Eastern European (CEE-10), including 
its effect on their real convergence towards the EU-15 development level. To this end, we test 
the relationships between selected macroeconomic variables linked to the EU enlargement 
and the rate of economic growth of the CEE countries over the period 1996-2007.  
Our exercise is anchored in both neoclassical and endogenous economic growth models. 
The former imply that development asymmetries between countries tend to decrease over 
time. However, they do not satisfactorily explain the long-run determinants of economic 
growth. Hence, our analysis also draws from endogenous growth models that provide a better 
explanation of growth drivers. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 below, we test the convergence 
hypothesis (both β and σ) for the CEE-10 group towards the EU-15 countries. In Section 3 we 
carry out the correlation and regression analyses, based on cross-section data, aimed to 
econometrically test the possible effect of the EU membership on economic growth of the 
CEE countries. Section 4 in turn develops tentative projections of real convergence of the 
CEE countries towards the EU-15. Section 5 concludes.  
  22. Income-level convergence between the CEE-10 and the EU-15 countries 
 2.1.  Methodology 
For the purpose of the present study, we will interpret the notion of real economic 
convergence as a trend towards the equalisation of income or development levels between 
countries; further on it is referred to as income-level or growth convergence.  
In this section, we conduct an empirical test of income-level convergence between ten 
CEE new EU member countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and the EU ‘core’ (EU-15).
 1  
Our approach is based on neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956; Mankiw et al., 
1992), which assume the feasibility of income-level convergence (or more precisely, 
conditional β-convergence). This implies that a less developed economy tends to grow faster 
than a more developed one. The convergence is conditional since it occurs when both 
economies move to the same steady-state. If a less developed economy always grew faster, 
we would deal with the absolute convergence.  
Since the CEE-10 countries are quite homogenous and follow similar paths of economic 
and social policies, they probably tend to the same steady-state. Thus, they should exhibit 
convergence tendencies as indicated by neoclassical models of economic growth. 
Another possible gauge of catching up is σ-convergence. It takes place if income 
differences between the economies concerned decrease over time. Income differentiation can 
be measured by the variance or standard deviation of GDP per capita. β-convergence is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the σ-convergence.  









αα =+ . (1) 
The explained variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 
period T and 0 while the explanatory variable is GDP per capita level in period 0. If α1 is 
negative, this proves the β-convergence. In such a case, we can calculate the value of β 





β =− + ) α
                                                
. (2) 
 
1 This part of the exercise, based on IMF data (IMF, 2008), is a follow-up of our earlier research on the subject 
(e.g. Matkowski, Próchniak, 2007abc; Próchniak, 2008ab; Rapacki, Próchniak, 2007; Rapacki, 2008 and 2009). 
 
  3With a view to test the σ-convergence, we estimate the trend line of dispersion in 
income levels between countries: 
() 01 sd ln t y αα =+ t . (3) 
The explained variable is the standard deviation of log GDP per capita levels between 
the economies while the explanatory variable is the time (t = 1,…,12 for the period 1996-
2007). The σ-convergence is corroborated if α1 is negative. 
2.2. Convergence towards the EU-15 
In this part we embark on the empirical test of β- and σ-convergence between the CEE-
10 countries and the EU-15.  
Beta convergence 
Our analysis corroborates the β-convergence of the CEE-10 countries towards the EU-
15 - it has been found both at individual country and at regional levels (the average for fifteen 
old EU members and the average for ten EU entrants). The results of our calculations are 
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
Table 1 
Regression results for β-convergence (CEE-10 & EU-15) 
 











convergence  β 
25 countries of the enlarged EU 
1996-2007 0.2911 –0.0244 5.94 –4.77  0.000  0.000  0.4974  yes  0.0284
1996-2001 0.1262 –0.0077 1.93 –1.12  0.067  0.273  0.0521  yes  0.0078
2001-2007 0.4228 –0.0367 7.00 –5.99  0.000  0.000  0.6091  yes  0.0415
2 regions (CEE-10 and EU-15) 
1996-2007 0.2862 –0.0246  .  .  .  .  1.0000  yes  0.0287
1996-2001 0.1132 –0.0071  .  .  .  .  1.0000  yes  0.0072
2001-2007 0.4534 –0.0406  .  .  .  .  1.0000  yes  0.0466
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, less-developed member countries of the enlarged EU 
(excluding Malta and Cyprus) recorded faster economic growth than those more developed.
2 
Similarly, Figure 1 demonstrates that the average annual growth rate of the 25 present EU 
members during 1996-2007 was inversely related to their initial GDP per capita level. The 
estimated trend line for the 25 countries has a slope –0.0244, which implies that β coefficient 
totals 2.84%. The value of R
2 has been depressed mainly due to the behaviour of Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Romania, and the Baltic states that markedly diverge from the trend line. 
                                                 
2 The only deviations from this general pattern are Ireland and Luxembourg, which exhibited remarkably fast 
growth (7.3% and 6.2% respectively) as for their initial income levels. 
  4Figure 1 
GDP per capita growth rate over the period 1996-2007 




























g y = -0.0244y 0 + 0.2911;    R
2 = 0.4974






8,50 8,70 8,90 9,10 9,30 9,50 9,70 9,90 10,10 10,30 10,50 10,70















































CEE-10 (average) & EU-15 (average)
CEE-10
EU-15
Trend line: CEE-10 and EU-15
Trend line: CEE-10 (average) & EU-15 (average)
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The convergence trend can be also traced at a more aggregate or regional level. Data in 
both Table 1 and Figure 1 unequivocally show that the average growth rate in the CEE-10 
was much higher than in the EU-15 while the initial GDP per capita was lower. The slope of 
the trend line for these two regions is –0.0246 with the β coefficient equal to 2.87%. 
As a consequence, while in 1996 the average GDP per capita in the CEE-10 ($ 8,097) 
represented slightly more than one-third of the EU-15 average ($ 21,119) by 2007 the relative 
development level of the former group increased to nearly 50% of the latter ($ 16,516 and $ 
33,234, respectively).  
The catching-up process accelerated in the second part of the period as the EU 
enlargement approached. Between 1996-2001 and 2001-2007, the β coefficient rose from 
0.78% to 4.15% for 25 countries whereas for the two regions involved it went up from 0.72% 
to 4.66%.  
It should be stressed however that our findings imply a relatively slow income-level 
convergence between the recent EU entrants and the old EU members. The β coefficient of 
2.84-2.87% suggests that, if the average economic growth patterns prevailing in 1996-2007 
continue, the EU-25 countries would need about 25 years to decrease by half the distance to 
their common hypothetical steady state. The same holds in particular true for CEE-10 
economies and the pace of their catching up vis-à-vis the EU-15 group. 
  5Sigma convergence 
The major finding of our empirical test under this heading is that the CEE-10 countries 
reveal a σ-convergence towards the EU-15, both in the country-by-country and sub-group 
examination. The results are reported in Table 2 and Figure 2. 
Table 2 
Regression results for σ-convergence (CEE-10 & EU-15) 
 












25 countries of the enlarged EU 
1996-2007 0.5925 –0.0121  55.85  –8.36  0.000  0.000  0.8749  yes 
1996-2001 0.5571 –0.0013  81.76  –0.76  0.000  0.491  0.1253  yes 
2001-2007 0.5581 –0.0183  495.26 –72.57 0.000  0.000  0.9991  yes 
2 regions (CEE-10 and EU-15) 
1996-2007 0.5161 –0.0121  52.09  –9.01  0.000  0.000  0.8903  yes 
1996-2001 0.4845 –0.0029  142.06 –3.30  0.000  0.030  0.7320  yes 
2001-2007 0.4853 –0.0191  231.60 –40.68 0.000  0.000  0.9970  yes 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2 shows that GDP differentials tended to diminish among the EU-25 members and 
between the CEE-10 region and the EU-15 area in the whole period 1996-2007 and in both 
sub-periods. For the whole period, the slope of estimated regression equations has been 
negative (–0.0121 for both the 25 countries and the two regions). 
Figure 2 
Standard deviation of GDP per capita, 1996-2007 (CEE-10 & EU-15) 
 
sd(y) = -0.0121t + 0.5925
R
2 = 0.8749



























































Trend line: country differentiation
Trend line: regional differentiation
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of the standard deviation of log GDP per capita levels. 
It decreased from 0.55 in 1996 to 0.43 by 2007 among the 25 countries and from 0.48 to 0.35 
between CEE-10 and EU-15, which is equivalent to claim that income differences between 
  6the CEE-10 countries and the EU-15 followed a downward trend. The most pronounced fall 
in income differentiation took place after 2000. 
Wrapping up, our analysis confirmed that the CEE-10 countries exhibited a strong 
economic convergence towards the EU-15 development levels. Moreover, the catching up 
process accelerated in the second half of the period as the EU enlargement approached. 
3. Economic growth determinants in the CEE-10  
3.1. Methodology 
In the preceding section, we showed that during 1996-2007 the CEE economies 
displayed on average a faster economic growth compared to EU-15 countries. Hence, we can 
raise the following question: was this fast economic growth caused only by the convergence 
mechanism (resulting from the differences in the marginal product of capital) or was it also 
driven by other factors? One of such potential factors was the accession of the CEE countries 
to the European Union. The effect of EU enlargement on economic growth could take place 
via two channels. The first channel entails the EU actions aimed at speeding up the progress 
of structural reforms in the CEE countries, changing their institutional environment, and 
facilitating the flows of goods, services, capital, and labour. The second channel involves the 
EU policies aimed at direct reduction of income differences between countries and regions.  
In this part of the study, we test empirically the hypothesis that the EU enlargement 
significantly contributed to economic growth of the CEE countries. To this end, we embark 
on correlation and regression analyses. To start with, we build an empirical model of 
economic growth (the multiple regression equation) that relates the GDP growth rate to its 
main determinants. The selection of explanatory variables is based on the correlation analysis. 
Once the model is built, it will be extended to include variables that measure the EU 
enlargement directly. If these variables are significant, we may assume that EU enlargement 
contributed to economic growth of the CEE countries. We will test many variants of the 
model to make our results more credible.  
The explained variable is the total real GDP growth rate. The explanatory variables were 
divided into two groups.  
The first group comprises those economic growth determinants that will serve as control 
variables in our regression equations. We test 21 variables grouped into 8 categories (see 
Table 3): (a) investments (in physical capital), (b) human capital, (c) consumption, (d) 
international trade, (e) government, (f) structure of the economy, (g) financial sector, (h) 
  7prices. The choice of control variables was based on our earlier review of empirical studies on 
economic growth determinants (Próchniak, 2006).  
Table 3 
Correlation of control variables with the GDP growth rate 
(EU-10 countries, 1996-2007) 
 
Variable Correlation 
Name Description  n r p 
Investments (in physical capital) 
gcf  Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  40  0.54  0.000 
gfcf  Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  40  0.46  0.003 
Human capital 
life  Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  40  –0.05  0.740 
mort  Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)  40  –0.30  0.063 
lfpri  Labour force with primary education (% of total)  40  –0.46  0.003 
lfsec  Labour force with secondary education (% of total)  40  –0.04  0.804 
lfter  Labour force with tertiary education (% of total)  40  0.36  0.022 
Consumption 
con  Final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)  40  –0.06  0.723 
houcon  Household final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)  40  –0.20  0.212 
govcon  General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)  40  0.27  0.093 
International trade 
exp  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  40  0.24  0.135 
imp  Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)  40  0.40  0.011 
expimp  Exports plus imports of goods and services (% of GDP)  40  0.32  0.043 
netexp  External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)  40  –0.50  0.001 
cab  Current account balance (% of GDP)  40  –0.60  0.000 
Government 
gov  General government balance (% of GDP)  39  0.53  0.000 
Structure of the economy 
agr  Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)  40  –0.47  0.002 
ind  Industry, value added (% of GDP)  40  –0.49  0.001 
ser  Services, value added (% of GDP)  40  0.64  0.000 
Financial sector 
cred  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  40  0.23  0.150 
Prices 
inf Inflation  (%)  40  –0.56  0.000 
 
n – number of observations, r – correlation coefficient, p – p-value. 
Significant correlations (p-value not greater than 0.1) with corrected (expected) sign are dark-shadowed. 
Not significant correlations with corrected (expected) sign are light-shadowed. 
All the data are 3-year averages. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The second group of explanatory variables encompasses those that measure the impact 
of EU enlargement on economic growth. We test 24 variables grouped into 4 categories (see 
Table 4): (a) foreign direct investments (FDI), (b) economic freedom, (c) progress in 
transition (or structural reforms), (d) aid. FDI, economic freedom, and the progress in 
systemic transformation represent the first transmission channel of the effects of EU 
enlargement on CEE countries. Aid, on the other hand, reflects the second transmission 
channel, related to EU funds transferred to less developed CEE countries and regions with a 
view to eliminate development asymmetries.  
  8Obviously, our set of variables that measure the influence of EU enlargement is far from 
perfect. We do not know exactly, to what extent FDI, economic freedom, and the progress in 
systemic transformation are the effect of the “EU factor”, and to what extent they result from 
broader economic changes in the world economy. In our view, however, the ‘external anchor’ 
due to (the prospects of) EU membership was an important driver of FDI inflow, increased 
economic freedom, and accelerated structural reforms in the CEE countries. This view has 
recently gained increased support among economists.
3 
Given the limited availability of data on EU structural and aid funds transferred to the 
CEE countries we decided to use a more comprehensive variable: aid as a proxy for the 
inflow of EU funds.
4  
The study covers 10 CEE countries (CEE-10 or EU-10) and the period 1996-2007. All  
calculations have been run for four 3-year averages: 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 
2005-2007 (however, for many variables the data for 2007 was not available and the average 
entails shorter period). Thus, we have 4 observations for each country and the maximum 
number of observations is 40 (10 countries × 4 observations). Since we analyse 3-year 
averages, we eliminate the influence of business cycles as well as supply- and demand-side 
shocks, both internal and external, on the rate of economic growth.  
The data used in the analysis come from the following sources: EBRD (2008), Eurostat 
(2008), Heritage Foundation (2008), IMF (2008), and World Bank (2008). 
3.2. Correlation 
The correlation analysis involved 21 control variables and 24 variables that measure the 
growth effects of EU enlargement. The results of the former are shown in Table 3 in the 
Appendix. Dark-shadowed cells in the table indicate the correlations that have correct 
(expected) sign and are statistically significant (with p-value below 0.1), whereas the light-
shadowed cells show the correlations that have expected sign, but are insignificant. 
Both variables representing investments: gross capital formation (gcf) and gross fixed 
capital formation (gfcf) reveal positive and significant correlations with the GDP growth rate. 
The values of correlation coefficients for gcf and gfcf are similar since both variables have 
almost the same coverage (the only difference being changes in stocks included in gcf).  
As regards human capital, the closest correlation with economic growth exhibit two 
categories of labour force: with tertiary education and with primary education (for the former 
the correlation coefficient is positive at the level of 0.36 whereas for the latter it is negative 
                                                 
3 See e.g. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2002, Washington D.C. 2002, p. 102.  
4 Aid includes both official development assistance (ODA) and official aid.  
  9and amounts to –0.46). Life expectancy and labour force with secondary education turned out 
to be uncorrelated with the GDP growth rate (correlation coefficients close to zero). In turn, 
mortality rate displayed an expected negative relationship with economic growth. Hence, we 
can claim that education was a crucial factor of economic growth in the CEE-10 countries.  
In contrast, consumption (% of GDP) was uncorrelated with economic growth. This was 
not the case of international trade, which proved to be an important growth driver. Both 
exports and imports rates featured positive and significant correlations with the GDP growth 
rate. However, the external balance on goods and services and current account balance were 
not positively correlated with economic growth. This means that high volume of international 
trade is a much more crucial economic growth determinant than good external balance.  
Similarly, sound fiscal policy aimed at reducing budget deficit was an important 
economic growth determinant. General government balance exhibits a significantly positive 
correlation with the GDP growth rate in the CEE-10 economies. 
Our results point also to a clear-cut relationship between the sectoral structure of the 
economy and economic growth. Higher GDP growth rates in the CEE-10 countries were 
associated with lower shares of agriculture and industry in their GDP, and with 
correspondingly higher share of the service sector.  
Our analysis also shows that a variable describing the financial sector, i.e. domestic 
credit to private sector displayed – as expected – a moderate positive correlation with 
economic growth in those countries. 
On the other hand, inflation rate was significantly and negatively correlated with the GDP 
growth rate (the correlation coefficient –0.56 is highly significant with p-value of 0.000). 
To wrap up, our findings point to a pretty good correlation between the GDP growth 
rate and the explanatory variables. Hence, our empirical models of economic growth appear to 
be credible and should have good statistical properties.  
Before selecting the control variables for the econometric model, we will first present 
the results of the correlation analysis for the second group of variables that measure the effect 
of EU enlargement. This is shown in Table 4. 
  10The data in Table 4 indicate that almost all the variables display an expected and – in 
most cases – significant correlation with economic growth. 
Table 4 
Correlation of EU-enlargement-related variables with the GDP growth rate 
(EU-10 countries, 1996-2007) 
 
Variable Correlation 
Name Description  n r p 
Foreign direct investments 
fdi  Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)  40  0.30  0.060 
fdi_pc  Foreign direct investment per capita, net inflows ($)  40  0.41  0.008 
Economic freedom 
ief  Index of economic freedom  40  0.56  0.000 
ief_bus  Index of economic freedom: business freedom  40  0.26  0.103 
ief_tra  Index of economic freedom: trade freedom  40  0.42  0.007 
ief_fis  Index of economic freedom: fiscal freedom  40  0.80  0.000 
ief_gov  Index of economic freedom: government size  40  0.28  0.075 
ief_mon  Index of economic freedom: monetary freedom  40  0.44  0.004 
ief_inv  Index of economic freedom: investment freedom  40  0.26  0.099 
ief_fin  Index of economic freedom: financial freedom  40  0.32  0.041 
ief_pro  Index of economic freedom: property rights  40  0.07  0.657 
ief_cor  Index of economic freedom: freedom from corruption  40  0.17  0.293 
Progress in transition (progress of structural reforms) 
ti_all Transition  indicator  40  0.48  0.002 
ti_privl Transition  indicator:  large scale privatisation  40  0.37  0.020 
ti_privs Transition  indicator:  small scale privatisation  40  0.48  0.002 
ti_ent  Transition indicator: enterprise restructuring  40  0.37  0.018 
ti_price Transition  indicator: price liberalisation  40  0.50  0.001 
ti_trade  Transition indicator: trade & forex system  40  0.37  0.019 
ti_comp  Transition indicator: competition policy  40  0.37  0.019 
ti_bank  Transition indicator: banking reform & interest rate liberalisation  40  0.50  0.001 
ti_sec  Transition indicator: securities markets & non-bank financial institut.  40  0.28  0.079 
ti_infr Transition  indicator: infrastructure reform  40  0.38  0.017 
Aid 
aid  Aid (% of GNI)  30  0.07  0.723 
aid_pc  Aid per capita ($)  30  0.63  0.000 
n – number of observations, r – correlation coefficient, p – p-value. 
Significant correlations (p-value not greater than 0.1) with corrected (expected) sign are dark-shadowed. 
Not significant correlations with corrected (expected) sign are light-shadowed. 
All the data are 3-year averages. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
FDI inflow was an important economic growth determinant for the CEE countries. 
FDI/GDP ratio and FDI per capita exhibit positive and significant correlations with the 
economic growth rate. Correlation coefficients equal 0.30 and 0.41 respectively. 
Similarly, economic freedom turned out an important growth driver. Index of economic 
freedom displays a significantly positive correlation with the GDP growth rate (correlation 
coefficient of 0.56 with p-value 0.000). The positive correlation with the GDP growth rate has 
been also confirmed by all the component variables. However, for both property rights and 
freedom from corruption the correlation is insignificant.  
  11  12
Structural reforms much contributed to economic growth of the CEE countries. The 
transition indicator and its component variables all show positive and significant correlations 
with the GDP growth rate.  
Aid (% of GNI) does not reveal any correlation with the economic growth (correlation 
coefficient equals 0.07 with p-value of 0.723). On the other hand, aid per capita shows a 
strong positive relationship with the GDP growth rate (correlation coefficient = 0.63 with p-
value of 0.000).  
Summing up, our findings indicate that the EU enlargement and the resulting higher FDI 
inflow, faster structural reforms, greater economic freedom, and increased transfer of EU 
funds can be deemed important determinants of economic growth of the CEE countries. 
With a view to enhance the credibility of our findings, we additionally performed the 
regression analysis. The selection of control variables for the econometric model was based 
on the results of correlation analysis discussed above. We chose one variable from each 
category except consumption. Thus, we used 7 control variables: (a) gross fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP), (b) labour force with tertiary education (% of total), (c) exports of 
goods and services (% of GDP), (d) general government balance (% of GDP), (e) services, 
value added (% of GDP), (f) domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), and (g) inflation 
(%).  
The second group of variables in our model includes those that measure the impact of 
the EU enlargement on the CEE countries. Based on Table 4, we selected 6 variables: (a) FDI, 
net inflow (% of GDP), (b) FDI per capita, net inflow ($), (c) index of economic freedom, (d) 
transition indicator, (e) aid (% of GNI), (f) aid per capita ($). To avoid doubling of data we 
excluded only the components of the index of economic freedom and the transition indicator. 
Prior to estimating various variants of the model, we conducted a multi-co-linearity test. 
About half of the correlations among our explanatory variables turned out statistically 
significant, indicating a possible multi-co-linearity. In such a case, the signs of the 
coefficients in the econometric model may be reversed. Nonetheless, seen from the economic 
angle, the multi-co-linearity does not violate the logical structure of the model because the 
explanatory variables represent different economic categories. 
 3.3. Regression 
We estimated six empirical models of economic growth. Each model was tested in 7 
variants. The basic variant comprises only control variables. Extended versions encompass 
both control variables and one variable measuring the effect of EU enlargement.  Table 5 
Regression models for the GDP growth rate (EU-10 countries, 1996-2007) 
 
  Model 1:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 1: with 
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 1: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 1: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 1: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 1: with
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 1: with 
aid_pc (EU-10)
Model 2:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 2: with
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 2: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 2: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 2: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 2: with 
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 2: with  
aid_pc (EU-10) 
–3.8641 –3.9126 –3.6215 –3.4095 –9.1225 –2.8123 –2.5683  –12.2512  –12.2760  –10.9698  –13.1372  –14.5212  –13.5917  –10.0633 
–0.96 –0.95 –0.91 –0.77 –1.67 –0.58 –0.64 –3.78 –3.82 –3.33 –3.81 –3.68 –3.36 –3.11  Constant 
0.346 0.351 0.369 0.445 0.104 0.566 0.528 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 
0.1505 0.1502 0.1510 0.1603 0.1791 0.2306 0.2455 0.1240 0.0989 0.0683 0.0849 0.1052 0.0807 0.0468 
1.40 1.37 1.43 1.40 1.66 1.77 2.12 1.41 1.11 0.73 0.84 1.17 0.71 0.54  gfcf 
0.171 0.180 0.162 0.172 0.107 0.093 0.047 0.167 0.274 0.472 0.407 0.249 0.482 0.595 
0.0244 0.0249 0.0322 0.0251 0.0378 0.0085  –0.0103  0.0496 0.0464 0.0531 0.0438 0.0606 0.0336 0.0218 
0.70 0.70 0.93 0.71 1.06 0.22  –0.29  1.28 1.20 1.39 1.10 1.50 0.73 0.56  lfter 
0.489 0.491 0.360 0.485 0.297 0.831 0.775 0.210 0.237 0.174 0.279 0.142 0.469 0.583 
–0.0146 –0.0157 –0.0311 –0.0128 –0.0288 –0.0158 –0.0218               
–0.67 –0.65 –1.29 –0.55 –1.21 –0.65 –0.95                exp 
0.508 0.522 0.207 0.585 0.234 0.524 0.354               
0.3947 0.3888 0.3378 0.4040 0.4197 0.1734 0.0001               
3.81 3.28 3.11 3.66 4.05 1.20 0.00                gov 
0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.243 1.000               
0.1289 0.1293 0.1298 0.1345 0.0993 0.1021 0.0673 0.2140 0.2124 0.2031 0.1898 0.1723 0.2374 0.1703 
2.03 2.00 2.08 1.99 1.51 1.51 1.04 3.51 3.52 3.37 2.77 2.34 3.81 2.65  ser 
0.051 0.055 0.046 0.055 0.143 0.146 0.312 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.025 0.001 0.014 
–0.0219 –0.0219 –0.0336 –0.0220 –0.0311 –0.0914 –0.1015               
–0.86 –0.84 –1.28 –0.85 –1.20 –2.43 –2.86                cred 
0.397 0.405 0.210 0.403 0.241 0.025 0.010               
–0.0496 –0.0496 –0.0509 –0.0505 –0.0398 –0.0728 –0.0690               
–1.82 –1.79 –1.90 –1.81 –1.44 –2.50 –2.54                inf 
0.078 0.083 0.067 0.080 0.162 0.021 0.020               
  0.0118         0.1413       
  0 . 1 1          1 . 3 3         fdi 
  0 . 9 1 3          0 . 1 9 4        
   0.0019         0.0019      
   1 . 4 9          1 . 5 1        fdi_pc 
   0 . 1 4 6          0.139      
    –   0 . 0 1 7 9 0 . 0 5 5 6             
    – 0 . 2 8 0 . 7 9                ief 
    0 . 7 8 0 0 . 4 3 3               
     2.0729         1.4688    
     1 . 4 1 1 . 0 1               ti_all 
     0.168         0.318    
      0.2378         0.8256   
      0 . 2 9 0 . 9 2              aid 
      0 . 7 7 5 0 . 3 6 5             
       0.0596         0.0673 
       1 . 7 7          2.19  aid_pc 
       0 . 0 9 2          0.038 
F  statistics  7.27 6.16 6.89 6.18 6.81 5.63 6.86  10.66  8.60 8.85 8.07 8.26 6.71 8.68 
p-value for F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
R
2  0.6213 0.6215 0.6475 0.6223 0.6450 0.6924 0.7330 0.4704 0.4958 0.5030 0.4798 0.4855 0.5178 0.5814 
R
2  adj.  0.5358 0.5205 0.5535 0.5216 0.5503 0.5693 0.6261 0.4263 0.4381 0.4462 0.4203 0.4267 0.4407 0.5144 
No.  of  obs.  39 39 39 39 39 29 29 40 40 40 40 40 30 30 
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  Model 3:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 3: with 
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 3: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 3: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 3: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 3: with
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 3: with 
aid_pc (EU-10)
Model 4:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 4: with
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 4: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 4: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 4: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 4: with 
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 4: with  
aid_pc (EU-10) 
–7.0203 –7.3887 –6.2036 –8.4335 –8.5406 –7.3695 –4.5324 –3.1200 –3.2198 –2.0863 –8.0360  –12.4119  –2.6069 –3.2917 
–2.03 –2.17 –1.85 –2.25 –1.90 –2.20 –1.43 –1.41 –1.46 –0.93 –2.53 –3.05 –0.75 –1.50  Constant 
0.049 0.037 0.073 0.031 0.066 0.037 0.164 0.167 0.152 0.358 0.016 0.004 0.462 0.145 
        0.2589  0.2314  0.1798  0.1197  0.1554  0.1959  0.1409 
        2.87  2.50  1.81  1.10  1.68  1.46  1.61  gfcf 
        0.007  0.017  0.079  0.280  0.101  0.157  0.120 
0.0598 0.0557 0.0620 0.0526 0.0648 0.0357 0.0311 0.0872 0.0835 0.0892 0.0613 0.0956 0.0835 0.0274 
1.64 1.55 1.76 1.41 1.71 0.98 0.94 2.04 1.96 2.14 1.43 2.41 1.54 0.63  lfter 
0.110 0.130 0.087 0.166 0.097 0.335 0.358 0.048 0.057 0.039 0.160 0.021 0.135 0.533 
              
               exp 
              
              
               gov 
              
0.1785 0.1725 0.1530 0.1472 0.1589 0.1679 0.1012               
3.09 3.02 2.66 2.22 2.30 3.02 1.80                ser 
0.004 0.005 0.012 0.033 0.027 0.006 0.084               
              
               cred 
              
–0.0155 –0.0147 –0.0146 –0.0144 –0.0144 –0.0173 –0.0147               
–2.73 –2.63 –2.66 –2.49 –2.40 –3.40 –3.20                inf 
0.010 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.022 0.002 0.004               
  0.1440         0.1490       
  1 . 4 8 1 . 2 2                  fdi 
  0 . 1 4 7 0 . 2 3 1                 
   0.0021         0.0024      
   1 . 9 0          1 . 7 0        fdi_pc 
   0 . 0 6 6          0.098      
    0 . 0 5 6 2          0.1423     
    0 . 9 7          2.08      ief 
    0 . 3 4 0          0.044     
     0 . 7 5 6 8          3.3701    
     0 . 5 4          2.64     ti_all 
     0 . 5 9 5          0.012    
      1.1107         0.5249   
      1 . 7 4 0 . 4 8              aid 
      0.094         0.637   
       0.0652         0.1032 
       2 . 5 3          3.37  aid_pc 
       0 . 0 1 8          0.002 
F  statistics  13.92 11.34 12.10 10.65 10.31 12.32 14.55  7.53  5.58  6.24  6.92  8.16  2.69  7.51 
p-value for F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.001 
R
2  0.5370 0.5644 0.5804 0.5491 0.5408 0.6635 0.6995 0.2893 0.3175 0.3421 0.3657 0.4049 0.2372 0.4642 
R
2  adj.  0.4985 0.5146 0.5324 0.4975 0.4883 0.6096 0.6515 0.2509 0.2606 0.2873 0.3129 0.3553 0.1491 0.4023 
No.  of  obs.  40 40 40 40 40 30 30 40 40 40 40 40 30 30 
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  Model 5:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 5: with 
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 5: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 5: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 5: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 5: with
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 5: with 
aid_pc (EU-10)
Model 6:  
basic (EU-10) 
Model 6: with
 fdi (EU-10) 
Model 6: with 
fdi_pc (EU-10)
Model 6: with
 ief (EU-10) 
Model 6: with 
ti_all (EU-10) 
Model 6: with 
 aid (EU-10) 
Model 6: with  
aid_pc (EU-10) 
3.3372  2.5172  2.4535  –3.5210 –5.3953  2.4740  0.9496  –7.6752 –8.0248 –6.9075 –9.3988 –8.0284 –8.0057 –4.5934 
3.76  2.46  2.69  –1.11 –1.19  2.83  1.05  –2.19 –2.33 –2.01 –2.51 –1.74 –2.44 –1.46  Constant 
0.001 0.019 0.011 0.276 0.241 0.009 0.303 0.035 0.026 0.052 0.017 0.090 0.022 0.157 
              
               gfcf 
              
0.0963 0.0902 0.0924 0.0675 0.0994 0.0726 0.0379               
2.52 2.39 2.56 1.75 2.70 1.86 1.10                lfter 
0.016 0.022 0.015 0.088 0.011 0.075 0.280               
              
               exp 
              
              
               gov 
              
        0.2094  0.2006  0.1857  0.1641  0.2055  0.1863  0.1072 
        3.74  3.64  3.32  2.48  3.16  3.57  1.93  ser 
        0.001  0.001  0.002  0.018  0.003  0.001  0.065 
              
               cred 
              
–0.0235 –0.0224 –0.0209 –0.0182 –0.0173 –0.0240 –0.0185 –0.0147 –0.0140 –0.0138 –0.0134 –0.0145 –0.0177 –0.0144 
–4.23 –4.06 –3.90 –3.14 –2.77 –4.55 –4.37 –2.55 –2.46 –2.46 –2.31 –2.34 –3.48 –3.15  inf 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.025 0.002 0.004 
  0.1649         0.1556       
  1 . 5 4          1 . 5 8         fdi 
  0 . 1 3 3          0 . 1 2 4        
   0.0027         0.0020      
   2 . 4 0          1 . 7 9        fdi_pc 
   0 . 0 2 2          0.082      
    0.1192         0.0725     
    2 . 2 3 1 . 2 6                ief 
    0 . 0 3 2 0 . 2 1 7               
     2.4849         0.1698    
     1 . 9 6 0 . 1 2               ti_all 
     0.057         0.905    
      0 . 8 4 8 1          1.3992  
      1 . 1 7          2.47   aid 
      0 . 2 5 3          0.021  
       0.0828         0.0749 
       3 . 3 2          3.17  aid_pc 
       0 . 0 0 3          0.004 
F  statistics  13.10  9.84  11.78 11.33 10.69 10.19 16.86 18.68 13.78 14.27 13.17 12.13 16.13 19.20 
p-value for F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2  0.4146 0.4505 0.4954 0.4857 0.4712 0.5405 0.6605 0.5024 0.5345 0.5432 0.5233 0.5026 0.6505 0.6890 
R
2  adj.  0.3829 0.4048 0.4533 0.4429 0.4271 0.4874 0.6213 0.4755 0.4957 0.5051 0.4836 0.4612 0.6101 0.6531 
No.  of  obs.  40 40 40 40 40 30 30 40 40 40 40 40 30 30 
Regression coefficients, t-statistics, and p-values are given in the respective cells. Definitions of variables are given in Tables 5 and 6. All the data are 3-year averages. 
Significant regression coefficients with the expected sign for the EU-enlargement-related variables are shadowed (light-shadowed cells correspond to a 20% significance level, dark-shadowed cells correspond to a 10% significance level. 
 
Source: Own calculations. Table 5 describes the estimated models. The explained variable is the growth rate of 
total real GDP. The explanatory variables are shown on the left-hand side of the table.  
Model 1 incorporates all seven explanatory variables. However, due to its unsatisfactory 
economic and statistical properties, it fails to explain the impact of EU enlargement on 
economic growth of the CEE countries. Nevertheless, its extended versions are included in 
Table 5 to ensure the coherence of its logical structure.  
The remaining models shown in Table 5 (models 2-6) explain correctly the economic 
growth determinants of the CEE countries. The explanatory variables have expected signs (as 
in the correlation analysis) and are – as a rule - significant. Models 2-6 were carefully chosen 
after a detailed screening of many other potential empirical growth models. The ones selected 
include 2 or 3 explanatory variables. The best properties feature the models with a relatively 
small number of variables due to two reasons. First, it is the outcome of multi-co-linearity of 
explanatory variables as indicated in Table 5. Second, the regression analysis based on a 
small number of observations (maximum 40) cannot accommodate too many explanatory 
variables; otherwise it would artificially overvalue the R-square coefficient.  
Models 2-6 explain very well the impact of the EU enlargement on economic growth of 
the CEE-10 countries. We do not discuss particular models in detail; instead, we highlight 
only the results that are most relevant to the effects of the EU enlargement. The latter include 
in particular the following findings. 
First, foreign investments (measured both as % of GDP or per capita) significantly 
contributed to economic growth of the CEE countries. This is confirmed by positive and 
highly significant regression coefficients (p-value for FDI/GDP ratio between 0.124 and 
0.231, depending on the model, and for FDI per capita - between 0.022 and 0.139). Based on 
the regression equation, we may quantify the impact of FDI on economic growth. Given the 
range of regression coefficients for FDI/GDP ratio (0.1413 to 0.1649), an increase of 
FDI/GDP ratio by 1 percentage point implies, ceteris paribus, higher economic growth rates 
by about 0.1-0.2 percentage points. In turn, regression coefficients for FDI per capita range 
from 0.0019 to 0.0027. This indicates that a rise in FDI per capita by $100 accelerates the 
economic growth by about 0.2-0.3 percentage points.  
Second, economic freedom turned out an important economic growth driver in the CEE 
countries, too. In models 2-6, regression coefficients of the index of economic freedom are 
positive and – except models 2 and 3 – statistically significant. Economic freedom has the 
highest significance in models 4 and 5 (p-values amount to 0.044 and 0.032 respectively, and 
  15the corresponding regression coefficients are 0.1423 and 0.1192). This suggests that an 
improvement in the index of economic freedom by 1 percentage point increases the GDP 
growth rate by roughly 0.1 percentage point. However, we have to emphasize that the index 
in question is a qualitative variable. Hence, when interpreting its quantitative contribution to 
economic growth one has to bear in mind the methodology of its calculation and the values it 
can assume (the range from 1 to 100). 
Third, the transition indicator assumes the expected positive regression coefficients in 
models 2-6. Still, this variable is significant only in models 4 and 5. The corresponding p-
values amount to 0.012 and 0.057, and the regression coefficients equal 3.3701 and 2.4849 
respectively. This implies that the increase in the transition indicator by 1 point brings about 
an acceleration of economic growth by 2-3 percentage points, which may suggest a very 
strong effect. Given however the scale of this indicator (from 1 to 4.3), its growth impact is 
much weaker and comparable to that of other variables.  
Fourth, aid was also an important economic growth determinant in the CEE countries, 
in particular in per capita terms. In models 2-6, this variable displays positive and highly 
significant regression coefficients (p-values from 0.002 to 0.038, and regression coefficients 
between 0.0652 and 0.1032), which suggests that a rise in the aid level by 10 $ accelerates 
economic growth by ca. 1 percentage point. This effect seems very strong, which may be 
misleading, as the prevailing low levels of aid per capita in the CEE countries ($ 12-73) 
might have overstated its differential growth impact. The second variable, aid/GNI ratio is 
significant only in models 3 and 6. The respective regression coefficients amount to 1.1107 
and 1.3992. This implies that a rise of the aid/GNI ratio by 1 percentage point leads to a 
similar acceleration of the GDP growth rate. This relationship is very strong and probably 
true, the more so that the inflow of foreign funds directly increases aggregate demand, thus 
enhancing economic growth.  
To conclude, our analysis has shown that the EU enlargement significantly contributed 
to economic growth of the CEE-10 countries. The major sources of this positive impact 
included: high FDI inflow, fast progress of structural reforms, economic freedom, and aid 
inflow. Good statistical properties of the regression equations confirm the robustness of our 
results. 
  164. Prospects of actual economic convergence between the CEE-10 and the EU-15 
As a wrap of the foregoing discussion, below we embarked on a tentative projection of 
possible scenarios of a complete catching up between the CEE-10 and EU-15 countries. 
Table 6. Possible scenarios of closing the development gap between the CEE-10 and the 
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capita in PPP, 











gap (GDP per 
capita in PPP, 
% of EU-15 
average) 
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level – revised 
scenario 
Bulgaria 25  5.1 35.6 32.9 5.1  30.4
Czech Republic  65  3.1 73.9 23.4 3.2  18.8
Estonia 33  7.1 61.0 9.7 6.2  11.1
Hungary 44  4.0 56.4 26.5 3.6  28.1
Latvia 28  8.0 50.4 11.5 6.8  13.6
Lithuania 31  7.3 55.6 11.1 6.2  13.1
Poland 39  4.4 50.1 27.6 4.3  25.5
Romania 23
1  6.5
2  38.5 20.2 6.2
3  19.9
Slovak Republic  43  5.1 64.0 14.1 5.1  13.0
Slovenia  66 4.2 82.4 8.2 4.1 7.9
EU-15 100  1.8 100.0 x 1.6  x
a – data for 2008 are the most recent Eurostat forecasts (as of mid-December 2008). 
1 – 1999,   2 – 2000-2008,   3 – 2000-2010. 
Source: Eurostat database and authors’ calculations.  
 
Table 6 compiles the input data necessary for carrying out the pertinent projections. It 
also sheds some empirical light on the pace of actual convergence process to date. The 
projections (base case) were derived from a simple extrapolation of the economic growth 
paths (real GDP per capita) of individual CEE-10 countries between 1997 and 2008, 
assuming that the average growth trend over the same period in the EU-15 sub-group will 
continue. Under these assumptions, it may take between 8 and 33 years for individual CEE-
10 economies - as data in the fifth column of Table 6 indicates - to close their 2008 
development gaps towards the EU-15 average. The first transition economy that is likely to 
fully catch up is Slovenia (by 2016), followed by Estonia (2018), Lithuania (2019) and Latvia 
(2020). On the other end of the spectrum are Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary whose real 
convergence process may be completed between 2035 and 2041 respectively. According to 
this basic scenario, the remaining new EU members ought to close their income gaps between 
2022 (Slovakia) and 2031 (Czech Republic).  
  17Apart of the base case projection, in Table 6 we also developed a revised scenario that 
partly incorporates the possible effects of the current crisis in the world economy on future 
economic growth of both individual CEE-10 countries and the EU-15 (simple extrapolation 
combined with a growth forecast for 2009-10). According to this scenario, while some 
individual new EU member countries are likely to gain (in particular the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria and Poland) and some may loose (especially the Baltic states) in terms of the length 
of catch up , the CEE-10 as a group would shorten the real convergence process.   
Obviously, the scenarios outlined above are subject to many uncertainties and 
contingent upon a number of key factors that may hinder the real convergence process and 
make it much slower compared to our projections. Hence, they should be interpreted as a 
reference only and a starting point for more comprehensive exercises aimed at fine-tuning the 
forecasts of the future real convergence trajectories between the CEE-10 and the EU-15 
countries to a turbulent economic reality.
5 
It is also worth stressing in this context that the EU membership does not offer a 
guarantee for the real income convergence of the CEE-10 countries towards the EU-15 level. 
As evidenced by the experience of Greece (until 1995) and Portugal (after 2000), regional 
integration may at times co-exist with real divergence trends (Rapacki, 2008). The challenge 
for the new CEE members therefore is to follow the patterns established by Ireland and Spain 
rather than those of Greece and Portugal. 
                                                 
5 One of the most interesting exercises of this kind can be found in a recent IMF study (Schadler et al., 2006).  
  185. Conclusions 
  The main findings of our study may be summarized in four points. 
1.  Our results indicate that the EU enlargement significantly contributed to economic 
growth of the CEE-10 countries. This claim is supported by both the convergence and 
economic growth determinants analyses.  
2.  There has been a clear-cut income-level convergence between the CEE-10 countries and 
the EU-15. The former grew on average faster than the latter during 1996-2007 while 
their initial income level was much lower. Moreover, the convergence process accelerated 
after 2000 as the EU enlargement approached. 
3.  The econometric test of economic growth determinants shows that four variables related 
to the EU enlargement: FDI inflow, economic freedom, progress of structural reforms, 
and aid inflow, are positively and significantly correlated with GDP growth rates in the 
CEE countries. The positive contribution of these factors to economic growth has been 
also corroborated by the regression equations. Good statistical properties of correlation 
coefficients and regression equations add to the robustness of our results. 
4.  According to our projections, the actual process of real convergence between individual 
CEE-10 economies and the EU-15 may take between 8 and 33 years. 
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